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Abstract 
There is much debate in machine ethics about the most appropriate way to introduce ethical 
reasoning capabilities into intelligent autonomous machines. Recent incidents involving autonomous 
vehicles in which humans have been killed or injured have raised questions about how we ensure 
that such vehicles have an ethical dimension to their behaviour and are therefore trustworthy. The 
main problem is that hardwiring such machines with rules not to cause harm or damage is not 
consistent with the notion of autonomy and intelligence. Also, such ethical hardwiring does not 
leave intelligent autonomous machines with any course of action if they encounter situations or 
dilemmas for which they are not programmed or where some harm is caused no matter what course 
of action is taken. Teaching machines so that they learn ethics may also be problematic given recent 
findings in machine learning that machines pick up the prejudices and biases embedded in their 
learning algorithms or data. 
This paper describes a fuzzy reasoning approach to machine ethics. The paper shows how it is 
possible for an ethics architecture to reason when taking over from a human driver is morally 
justified. The design behind such an ethical reasoner is also applied to an ethical dilemma resolution 
case. One major advantage of the approach is that the ethical reasoner can generate its own data for 
learning moral rules (hence, ‘autometric’) and thereby reduce the possibility of picking up human 
biases and prejudices.  
The results show that a new type of metric-based ethics appropriate for autonomous intelligent 
machines is feasible and that our current concept of ethical reasoning being largely qualitative in 
nature may need revising if want to construct future autonomous machines that have an ethical 
dimension to their reasoning so that they become moral machines.  
Keywords: Moral machines; artificial morality; intelligent autonomous vehicles; autonomous 
intelligent systems.  
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1. Background and introduction 
 
The International Federation of Automatic Control defines “intelligent autonomous vehicles” (IAVs) 
as “automated vehicles capable of performing motion control tasks in unstructured or partially 
structured environments with little (if any) assistance from human supervisors.”1  The potential 
capability of IAVs was still in doubt as recently as 10 years ago, with research in IAVs confined to 
simple laboratory environments due to difficulties of finding ways to incorporate and integrate 
intelligent sensing, reasoning, action, learning and collaboration [1]. The most promising 
developments up to that time included subsumption architectures, where IAV perception was linked 
to action without the need for an internal representation of the environment, and with multiple 
control layers where each represented a behaviour [2,3].  Subsumption architectures led to major 
developments in walking robots [4], small rovers for Mars missions [5] and sociable robots [6]. A 
more classical, symbolic control approach was Autonomous Robotic Architecture (AuRA), where 
different modules for planning, reasoning and motion interacted via schemas for collision avoidance 
and problem resolution [7].  Perhaps the most successful approach was the Intelligent Controller (IC) 
architecture, which combines the subsumption approach with modules to create internal 
representations from incoming sensor data to fuse with previous sensor data [8, 9]. The IC 
architecture has been successfully applied to several unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles (e.g. 
[10]). Other developments included enhancing general cognitive architectures such as Soar [11] and 
ACT-R [12], with perception and actuation modules for interaction with the environment. Such 
cognitive architectures are characterized by the use of production rules and supplemented with 
additional algorithms for dealing reactively [13,14]. Real-time control system (RCS)  developed at 
NIST is a reference model architecture involving a systematic mapping using nodes, where a node 
consists of behaviour generation, sensory processing, world modelling and evaluation. RCS was 
applied to autonomous on-road driving in 2004 [15]. Underlying all IAV approaches so far are three 
basic stages: sensing and processing, decision making, and reacting.  
DARPA’s sponsorship of a series of AV challenges started in 2004, when a competition was held to 
self-navigate over 140 miles of desert roadway in 10 hours. The aim at that time was that a third of 
military vehicles should be AVs by 2015. But in 2004 no AVs could proceed more than a few miles 
without crashing. Improvements in control software, collision avoidance, road following as well as 
radar and laser sensing technologies contributed to significant advances so that, in 2007, the route 
was changed to 60 miles of urban conditions. Four AVs completed the task in the six-hour time limit 
allowed. Since that time, advances have led to several spin-offs in conventional vehicles, such as lane 
adhesion, emergency braking and self-parking. Currently, AV technology and development are being 
driven by major car manufacturers such as Mercedes, Nissan, BMW, VW, Volvo and GM, with Google 
emerging as another major contributor in 2009 with its Self-Driving Car Project (evolved to Waymo 
in 2016) building on its Google Maps data to recognize locations. In 2015 Tesla introduced the Model 
S which has autonomous steering, side collision avoidance, lane changing and parallel parking 
capabilities. Software updates to its Autopilot system now allow Model S to self-park without the 
driver being in the car. Also in 2015 Delphi Automotive developed an AV that drove over 3000 miles 
coast-to-coast across North America under autonomous control for 99% of the distance.  
                                                          
1 https://tc.ifac-control.org/7/5/activities/ifac-intelligent-autonomous-vehicles-iav-symposium 
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A classification system was released in 2014 by the automotive standardization body SAE 
International, based on the amount of driver attention required [16]. Level 0 is driver only, where 
the driver manages all driving aspects (steering, speed, monitoring of driving environment). Level 1 
is assisted, where the driver is given support for either steering (e.g. parking) or speed (e.g. cruise 
control) in specific situations. Level 2 is partial automation, where the driver is given support for 
both steering and speed (e.g. lane adherence with cruise control) but must continue monitoring the 
driving environment to intervene when necessary. Level 3 is conditional automation where the 
driver can relinquish control to an automated driving system which controls steering, speed and 
monitoring of the driving environment but must be ready to take back control. Level 4 is high 
automation where the automated driving system controls all aspects of the dynamic driving task 
(steering, braking, speed, environment monitoring, changing lanes) even if a human driver does not 
respond appropriately to a request to intervene. Finally, Level 5 is complete end-to-end journey 
without any driver intervention. The distinctions between “automated”, “automatic” and 
“autonomous” are not always clear [17, 18], but it is generally accepted that autonomous vehicles 
are characterized by vehicles achieving levels 3, 4 and 5 of the SAE classification system, where the 
driver relinquishes control of the driving environment either partly or fully.  
The need for artificial intelligence and intelligent decision-making to play a role in autonomous 
control systems was recognized early in the 1990s [17].  Since that time, major advances in 
autonomous vehicles have been driven by increases in processing power and big data. 
Supercomputers can now process massive amounts of sensor, camera and radar data in processors 
capable of operating at over three hundred trillion operations per second for the sensing and 
processing stage. Associated with these technological advances is “deep learning”, where training 
data is fed into neural networks consisting of dozens or even hundreds of layers on GPU-accelerated 
platforms [19] for learning about traffic conditions and making decisions. But alongside predictions 
by industry commentators that advances in big data and deep learning are leading to level 5 IAVs 
within a matter of years [20], there are signs of scepticism that full autonomy will be achieved in 
such a short time as well as worries that over-expectation can lead to an ‘AI winter’ [21]. The main 
problem appears to be that, despite technological advances in sensors, architectures and processing 
power, it is not clear how to program basic “common sense” for dealing with new situations into 
such technologies [22]. The main reason for this scepticism lies in the nature of the accidents 
involving autonomous vehicles that have occurred up to now.   
One of the main motivations for autonomous vehicles is that they are intended to be safer than 
vehicles controlled by the average human driver. For 2015, there were approximately 3.6 road 
fatalities per 1 billion vehicle-driven km in the UK, 7.1 in the USA and 8.7 in New Zealand [23].  
Autonomous vehicles and especially fully-autonomous vehicles have not been driven for long 
enough for comparable fatality numbers to be reliably calculated. So far, there have been four 
fatalities involving partially autonomous vehicles: three involving Tesla Autopilot (twice in 2016, 
once in 2018) and one involving Uber (in 2018).  
In January 2016, a Tesla car in Hebei, China, crashed into the back of a road-sweeping truck, killing 
the driver. The lack of any evidence of car braking or swerving has led to claims that the Autopilot 
was engaged but failed to work properly. In May of that year, a Tesla car in Williston, Florida, 
crashed into a tractor trailer while in Autopilot, with the cause identified as the white side of the 
trailer not being distinguished from the brightly lit sky and so the brake not applied. In March 2018, 
a self-driving Uber car killed a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona, when she walked her bicycle across a 
street at 10pm. Also in March 2018, in Mountain View, California, a Tesla car in Autopilot set for 75 
miles an hour crashed into a safety barrier, killing the driver and causing two other vehicles to crash 
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into it. There is still uncertainty as why the vehicle hit the barrier and why the driver did not take 
avoidance action in response to warning sounds. Such fatalities inevitably raise questions concerning 
the need for improved sensor technology as well as enhancements to both the decision making and 
action stages of control.   
However, one critical aspect is frequently ignored when discussing the role of AI in autonomous 
control systems, which is the need to ensure that autonomous cars realise that it is wrong to take 
actions (or not to take actions) that can lead to humans being killed. In other words, while 
technological advances in sensor technology, architectures, hardware and programming may well 
lead to improvement in autonomous vehicle safety, another approach is to ensure that autonomous 
vehicles under intelligent control acquire an ethical sense that will ensure that their sensor-based 
decisions do not harm humans no matter what control architectures or types of technology are 
being used. This, after all, is what underlies human driver behaviour irrespective of the actual car 
being driven or driver-assisted technology being used in that car.  
It is important to distinguish three types of relationship between ethics and autonomous systems. 
The first type is ethical design, which is a method for encouraging the design of systems for human 
values [24] and the consideration of ethical issues when designing and developing systems [25]. The 
IEEE Standards Association has recently launched a global initiative on ethical design approaches for 
autonomous and intelligent systems which outlines ethically aligned design around the principles of 
human rights, well-being, accountability, transparency and awareness of misuse [26]. A number of 
content committees and working groups are currently working on recommendations for standards 
to ensure that ethical considerations are prioritized in design and development of autonomous 
systems for the benefit of humanity. The second type is the ethics of autonomous systems and the 
consideration of whether it is right or wrong to construct such systems [27]. Such considerations 
take in to account the possibly dehumanizing aspects of research into AI as well as implications, such 
as loss of jobs and the dangers of superintelligence [28]. 
The third type is machine ethics, which is the area that concerns how we give ethical principles to 
intelligent systems so that such systems can decide for themselves what is right and wrong [29]. The 
problem is that programming ethical principles into an autonomous system is like hard-wiring the 
system so that it must follow these principles. The contradiction here is that such hard-wiring goes 
against the notion of intelligent autonomous systems that are supposed to make informed decisions 
for themselves [30]. “I avoided killing the pedestrian because I’m hard-wired to do so” is a  
deontological  statement that does not allow for exceptions, as might be the case when the vehicle 
has to decide whether to run over ten children crossing the road or one person on the pavement 
with no other options available.  For an autonomous system to do only what it is told to do raises 
questions as to what autonomy means. More importantly, it raises questions as to whether the four 
fatalities that have so far occurred were due to the system not being able to do other that what it 
was programmed to do. In other words, because there was no ethical component in the 
autonomous system, it followed instructions and executed actions blindly with no concept of the 
harm that such actions could cause.  
The overall purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of introducing an ethics reasoner into 
intelligent control systems in general, and IAVs in particular. While there is much research and 
debate concerning the rights and wrongs of AI, as well as what forms of ethics should be built into 
machines, the issue of how we design and implement an ethical reasoner for use in intelligent, 
autonomous machines is relatively unexplored. The purpose of this paper is to explore how ethical 
decision-making can be built into autonomous control systems so that future IAVs have an ethical 
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dimension to their behaviour. More precisely, the aim is to explore methods for making autonomous 
vehicles calculate and behave as moral agents [31] and so shed light on ‘artificial morality’ [32,33]. 
Three problems need to be addressed [34] when designing, developing and implementing an ethical  
or moral machine. The first problem concerns the type and degree of interactivity that allows the 
moral machine to respond ethically to its environment. The second is the degree of autonomy from 
the environment that allows the moral machine to go through an ethical reasoning process of its 
own. And the third is amount of adaptability the moral machine is allowed to change its ethical 
reasoning processes. Together, these three desirable properties provide the basis for a trustworthy 
moral machine. The extent of the trust placed on such moral machines will depend on how it 
responds to different ethical situations and its ability to provide justifications for its responses.  
We show how a fuzzy logic approach, which has the ability to reason under inexact or partial sensor 
knowledge, can produce a spectrum of ethical outputs based on different types and degree of 
interactivity. We will demonstrate through simulation and experiment how autonomous ethical 
decision making can be undertaken separately from environment sensor data. Finally, we will show 
how the decision-making system can adapt to new and changing situations, especially situations 
containing dilemmas. As far as we are aware, this is the first time that a fuzzy logic approach has 
been used to demonstrate ethical decision making for possible use in a moral machine. 
2. Previous work 
Ethical theories deal with rules or criteria for distinguishing right from wrong as well as good from 
bad. Examples of ethical theories are deontology (we must act according to duties and obligations), 
categorical imperative (we must act in accordance with human rational capacity and certain 
inviolable laws), utilitarianism (an action is right or good if it leads to most happiness) and 
consequentialism theories in general (whether an action is right or good depends on the action’s 
outcome or result). Another approach is virtue ethics (we must act in ways that exhibit our virtuous 
character traits), where a trait is what allows us to fulfil our function. For humans, one specific 
function is to think rationally, and so virtue ethics is ethics led by reason to perform virtuous actions.  
Previous approaches to implementing ethical reasoning in computers have not always clearly 
identified the ethical approach adopted and have involved case-based reasoning, neural networks, 
constraint satisfaction, category theory, and abductive logic programming as well as inductive logic 
programming. We present a brief overview below. 
Early attempts in case-based reasoning approaches include Truth-Teller and SIROCCO, where the 
former identified shared features in a pair of ethical dilemmas and the latter retrieved ethical cases 
similar to a new case [35]. However, case-based reasoning systems in general are intended to 
support human ethical decision-making rather than help machines perform ethical reasoning on 
their own. Artificial neural network (ANN) approaches that learn ethical outputs from training 
samples [36] require specific topology and learning architectures for successful testing, with 
uncertainty concerning how to characterize the type of moral reasoning involved in the learning 
interaction. Also, the lack of rule-based reasoning capability internally or as output can lead to 
criticisms that such networks lack both transparency and autonomy. That is, such networks can only 
go through an internal and possibly ethically uninterpretable transition when given an input from 
the environment. Constraint satisfaction approaches [37, 38], while useful for certain types of AI 
problems requiring optimal solutions that do not violate conditions, assume full observability of the 
world (‘closed world assumption’) that can cause problems when knowledge is partial, vague or 
uncertain.  Also, the need not to violate constraints is a form of deontology: actions are right or 
wrong depending only on rules rather than consequences. This makes the application of constraint 
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satisfaction approaches to ethical dilemmas difficult, since dilemmas involve a decision to be made 
between two opposing constraints. Category theory approaches [39, 40] lead to ethical reasoning 
being interpreted as a functional process of mappings, or morphisms, from a domain of entities to a 
codomain. The use of category theory in machine ethics applies this formal approach so that an 
ethically relevant decision is correct if a formula containing that decision can be identified and 
proved as a theorem in an axiomatic system. As noted earlier, formal rule-based approaches to 
machine ethics, such as category theory and constraint satisfaction, raise questions concerning 
genuine autonomy. Such machines can only do what they are programmed to do within the formal 
system.  Prospective, or abductive, logic approaches [41] attempt to ‘look ahead’ to future states 
before selecting a posteriori preferences. While the application of such an approach in machine 
ethics has the advantage of allowing a degree of consequentialism, the choice between preferences 
needs the support of a knowledge base and a set of non-violable integrity constraints. Such 
abductive logic approaches, similar to the other formal approaches of constraint satisfaction and 
category theory, depend on the closed world assumption of a preference not being against known 
principles and constraints which are hardwired into the program. Finally, inductive logic 
programming approaches can be used for machine learning of prima facie duty theory, and where 
there is no single absolute duty to be adhered to for deciding whether an IAV should or should not 
take over control [42,43]. The requirement is for a list of binary ethical features, a list of duties for 
minimizing or maximizing, and a list of actions.  A number of cases can be represented in these data 
structures for machine learning of ethical principles, together with preferable actions as target 
(class) values, leading to a standard training-testing regime for learning when, morally, to take over 
control from a human driver. However, it is not clear how non-binary features can be handled (e.g. 
the varying desirability of respecting driver autonomy depending on continuously changing sensor 
information). Nor is it clear how missing, partial or inexact values affect the learning of ethical 
principles, since all features need to have values for the inductive engine to operate on a complete 
and consistent basis. Finally, there is a slowly emerging consensus that inductive machine learning 
algorithms with human specified feature values could be subject to algorithmic bias or learn biases 
in supplied data [44,45,46]. It is especially important for moral machines not to learn specific ethical 
preferences of programmers or biases in supplied data if they are to be considered trustworthy.  
In summary, previous applied work in machine ethics does not address all three of the desirable 
properties of machine ethics. Interactivity is typically implemented through fixed data input (e.g. 
training data) rather than sensors that produce dynamically changing data. Previous approaches 
have not shown how moral decision making can vary through interaction with a dynamic 
environment.  Adaptability is implemented as classifying unseen cases after successful training, as in 
the case of inductive logic programming and ANNs. However, another more intuitive sense of 
adaptability is the generalization or application from what is known from previous cases so that 
moral decisions continue to be made consistently for situations not previously encountered. Finally, 
there is a tendency to ‘over-prescribe’ the system with strict and formal moral rules, leading to 
questions as to how much genuine autonomy a machine ethics system contains. In particular, moral 
decision-making is typically based on formal rule-following rather than internal reasoning based on 
state-matching and state-transition, both of which may be approximate or imprecise. 
As can be seen from the above, machine ethics is a comparatively under-explored area of artificial 
intelligence in general and machine learning in particular. The aim of this paper is to explore a 
radically different approach to machine ethics using inexact, or fuzzy, reasoning that aims to address 
the problem of ethical decision making. Any approach to machine ethics must also demonstrate that 
it can cope with ethical dilemmas, since such dilemmas test the ability of the system to go beyond 
what it has learned to do in specific situations to situations not previously encountered. In particular, 
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dilemmas test the ability of an ethical system to balance conflicting aspects of duty against 
consequences.  
3. Machine ethics design considerations 
A characteristic of nearly all previous attempts to get machines to perform ethical reasoning is the 
use of a normative approach that can be called ‘top down’: machine ethics systems are designed and 
built with strict rules already in place for drawing conclusions. As noted above, this leads to 
questions concerning genuine autonomy of such systems. When rules are not explicitly given to the 
system, as in the case of ANNs, there are problems of possible data bias as well as lack of 
transparency concerning reasons for the moral output. A much better approach may be to provide a 
minimal set of principles rather than hard rules that can be universally agreed with and then allow 
the machine ethics system ‘decide for itself’ (autonomy) how to apply those principles in 
dynamically changing environments (interactivity) to derive moral rules that will allow it to monitor 
and change its behaviour in the light of new information (adaptability).   
Another problem is that previous approaches, apart from ANNs, have used formalisms for 
representing moral rules that reduce the ability of the system to reason flexibly. Since natural 
language is used to express moral arguments and reasoning, it may be better to represent moral 
principles and reasoning in ways that are more naturalistic than formalistic. Fuzzy logic is a 
representation method for modelling logical reasoning based on fuzzy sets [47] and is particularly 
useful for handling natural language reasoning [48].  
Consider the following scenario. An IAV is currently under the control of a human driver, who is 
driving along a multi-lane highway at 50 mph. Three sensors provide data on distance to the vehicle 
in front, keeping within the lane and current speed. The data from these three sensors are 
monitored constantly. The sensor technology question is under what physical circumstances 
(distance to next vehicle, location within lane, speed) the IAV should take over control if there is 
danger of an accident in order to prevent or reduce the impact of the accident. The ethical question 
is when is it morally acceptable to take over control if there is danger of an accident. The moral 
question may need to take into account respect for the driver’s autonomy and consequences of 
taking over in a way that the sensor technology question does not.   A related ethical question is, 
after taking over control and implementing remedial action, under what circumstances is it morally 
justified to hand back control to the human driver so that the autonomy of the driver is respected, 
even if the driver does not take back control.  
To address these ethical questions, we start with two very general and non-controversial virtuous 
moral principles (VMPs) for an IAV: 
VMP1:  If it is right to take control and if it is good take control, then the virtuous outcome is to take 
control. 
VMP2: If it is wrong to take control and if it is bad to take control, then the virtuous outcome is to not  
take control. 
In this scenario, right and wrong are related to the duty to take control in a dynamic driving situation 
as given by sensor readings, and good and bad are related to the effects of taking control on the 
autonomy of the human driver in that situation. So we hypothesize two reasoners: a ‘right/wrong’ 
reasoner for dealing with the right/wrong or duty dimension, and a ‘good/bad’ reasoner for dealing 
with the ‘good/bad’ or utilitarian dimension. The ‘right/wrong’ and ‘good/bad’ reasoners reflect very 
generally deontological and consequentialist approaches, respectively. VMP1 and VMP2 are virtue 
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ethics principles for an ethical IAV that has as its main function the taking into account of both the 
deontological and consequentialist aspects of the situation through rational decision making.   
4. Methods 
4.1 Representations 
Right and wrong actions, as well as good and bad actions, need to be described in terms of risk. For 
the right/wrong reasoner (‘right_wrong’), the three sensors are represented through the fuzzy 
variables of distance, lane and speed. Each has high-risk and low-risk values that can be described 
through membership functions (MFs), where the horizontal axis specifies all values of the set and 
the vertical axis the risk value from 0 (not at all) to 1 (totally). For instance, for speed, the sensor 
readings can go from 0 mph to 100 mph on the horizontal axis, and the two risk values of ‘low risk’ 
and ‘high risk’ are as shown in Figure 1. Low risk (in red) is identified as having maximal membership 
value 1 until 40 mph, at which point its membership value drops steadily to 0 at 80 mph. High risk (in 
black) has 0 membership value until 40 mph, at which point its membership value increases steadily 
to 80 mph, at which point it has maximum membership value. These trapezoidal-shaped 
membership functions (‘trapmf’ under Current MF Type in Figure 1) can be differently set for 
different variables. For instance, for lane, low risk (Figure 2, in red) can retain maximal membership 
value until sensor reading 8, at which point it drops sharply to minimal membership value at sensor 
reading 9 (Figure 2). High risk, (in black) on the other hand, is minimal until reading 7, at which point 
it rises sharply to maximal at reading 8. The lane variable is assumed to return high risk readings for 
proximity to edges of the lane and low risk readings for being central in the lane.  
 
Figure 1: Fuzzy membership functions (MFs) for low risk and high risk for the variable ‘speed’ as part of the right/wrong 
reasoner,, as depicted using MATLAB’s fuzzy logic toolbox. At the upper left  of the figure are the three input variables 
‘distance’, ‘lane; and ‘speed’ (with ‘speed’ highlighted to show its MFs) corresponding to three sensors, as well as the 
output variable ‘tcrightwrong’ (for ‘take control right or wrong’). The horizontal axis for ‘speed’ consists of mph readings 
(‘range’) and the vertical axis describes the amount of set membership for the two MFs of ‘lowrisk’ and ‘highrisk’, both of 
which have trapezoidal shape (‘trapmf’). The parameters box describes the initial, second, third and fourth points of the 
trapezoid (in this case, for ‘low risk’ highlighted in red).    
 
9 
 
 
Figure 2: Fuzzy MFs for ‘lane’ of the right/wrong reasoner, indicating low risk being minimal until sensor reading 8 and 
dropping to minimal at sensor reading 9, whereas high risk is minimal until sensor reading 7, at which point it rises sharply 
to maximal at sensor reading 8. 
 
The Supplementary Information (SI) appendix contains the MFs for the third variable distance for the 
right/wrong reasoner (Table 1, SI), where low risk is maximal until value 5 and minimal for value 6, 
and high risk is minimal until 5 and maximal from level 6. The right/wrong reasoner also contains an 
output variable labelled tcrightwrong (for ‘take control right or wrong’), which has the two MFs: one 
for ‘take control is right’ (‘tcright’) and the other for ‘take control is wrong’ (‘tcwrong’). These MFs 
can be specified as sigmoidal rather than trapezoidal (Figure 3), where ‘tcwrong’ is maximal until 
value 7 and drops gradually to minimal at value 10 (falling sigmoid MF, or zmf), and ‘tcright’ is 
minimal until value 4 and then rises gradually to value 7, where it is maximal (rising sigmoid MF, or 
smf). The outcome of this right/wrong reasoner is specified to be in the range of 1 to 10). These MFs 
can be changed  to other values and shapes if necessary.    
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Figure 3: MFs for the moral output of right and wrong on a scale of 1-10, with ‘take control is wrong’ (tcwrong) being 
maximal until value 7 (in red) and ‘take control is right’ (tcright) being minimal until 4.5 (in black).  
4.2  Architecture 
As noted above, two ethical reasoners are used at the first level of the ethical reasoning 
architecture: one for (deontological) right/wrong, and the other for (consequentialist) good/bad. 
Both reasoners use the same three input variables (distance, lane, speed) and MFs (high risk, low 
risk), but the use of the same variables and MFs in each reasoner need not necessarily be the case. 
For our example, the MF parameter values for the good/bad reasoner are different from those for 
the right/wrong reasoner (Supplementary Information (SI), Table 1).   
Each reasoner has general principles for producing moral output from their inputs.  For the 
right/wrong reasoner, two right/wrong principles (RWPs) are: 
RWP1. If distance is low risk, lane is low risk and speed is low risk then take control is wrong. 
RWP2. If distance is high risk, lane is high risk and speed is high risk then take control is right.  
These two principles are minimal and morally non-controversial. They describe the extreme 
circumstances under which taking over control from the human driver is right or wrong.   
Similarly, two minimal and non-controversial principles are used for the good/bad reasoner (GBPs), 
with the outcomes being taking control is bad and taking control is good: 
GBP1. If distance is low risk, lane is low risk and speed is low risk then take control is bad. 
GBP2. If distance is high risk, lane is high risk and speed is high risk then take control is good. 
These consequentialist principles take into account the effect on the driver’s autonomy. The 
standard fuzzy conjunction operator of minimum value is used to calculate the value of the 
consequent and hence the outcome for all principles.   
4.3 Forming an ethical judgement 
The virtuous meta-ethical controller (VMEC) at the next level takes as input the two moral outcomes 
of right/wrong and good/bad to produce a summative moral judgement. The two principles of the 
VMEC are VMP1 and VMP2 (as described earlier): 
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VMP1:  If it is right to take control and it is good take control, then the virtuous action is to take 
control. 
VMP2: If it is wrong to take control and it is bad to take control, then the virtuous action is to not  
take control. 
There are two VMEC  membership functions for each input specified not in terms of risk but in terms 
of rational outcome. For right/wrong, the two membership functions (‘right wrong don’t take 
control’, rwdtc; ‘right wrong take control’, rwtc) are specified as decreasing and increasing sigmoid 
functions (Figure 4), whereas for good/bad the two membership functions (‘good bad don’t take 
control, gbdtc; ‘good bad take control’, gbtc) are specified as trapezoidal for the purpose of example 
(SI, Table 1). The output is ‘virtuous control decision’, which has two membership functions: virtuous 
not to take control (‘vcno’) and virtuous to take control (‘vcyes’). These are specified as falling and 
rising sigmoids around the mid point 5.5 on a scale of 1-10 (Figure 5).  
The two principles for the VMEC (VMPs) are virtuous because they make the VMEC a good controller 
by taking deontological and consequentialist aspects into account when deciding on the best course 
of action so that controller best fulfils its function.  
The overall architecture is given in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 4: First input to the virtuous meta ethics controller (VMEC) consisting of the output from the right/wrong dimension, 
consisting of two sigmoidal membership functions ‘right wrong do not take control’ (rwdtc) and ‘right wrong take control’ 
(rwtc) 
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Figure 5: The output from the VMEC is specified through two sigmoidal membership functions “virtuous not to take control” 
(vcno, in red) and “virtuous to take control” (vcyes, in black) 
4.4 Producing a crisp output 
A key aspect of all fuzzy systems is the method used to produce ‘crisp’ output based on membership 
functions. The most common output calculation method involves centroids (calculating the centre of 
gravity of the summed combined subareas of membership functions) using the Mamdani method of 
aggregated output distribution [49], which is the method used here. 
 
Figure 6: Overall architecture of fuzzy ethical reasoning system, where sensor data concerning distance, lane adherence and 
speed are input to the right/wrong (deontological) reasoner and the good/bad (consequentialist) reasoner, each of which 
produces output values for the virtuous meta-ethics controller to produce summative ethical output values. Each reasoner 
and controller contains two ethically uncontroversial principles (six principles in total).  
All the parameters used so far are chosen for demonstration purposes, and it is up to designers of 
IAV ethical system designers to use the most appropriate variables, the number and type of 
membership functions as well as the principles depending on the environment in which the IAVs are 
intended to be used. The key point is that all moral principles are minimal, uncontroversial and 
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sensible for any IAV to adhere to. The use of fuzzy logic ensures that there is no over-reliance on 
programming rules for every particular situation. 
After the model is designed and developed, simulations across a range of input values can determine 
the effectiveness of the design choices as well as produce moral output that can be used to learn 
ethical rules without human direction, as will be seen below. 
MATLAB R2015b and Simulink were used for all simulations, and SPSS v23 (cluster analysis, 
regression) and Weka 3.6.13 (ANN, rule induction) for data analysis and machine learning. 
5. Experiments and results 
5.1 Ethics of taking control 
The behaviour of this ethical system was simulated continuously for 10 time units by setting the 
speed sensor to go through one full cycle of speeds from 0 to 100 mph, the lane sensor to go 
through two full cycles from 1 to 10 and the distance sensor to go through four full cycles from 1 to 
10.  At the end of the simulation, three streams of outputs are produced for each ethical reasoner 
based on their separate membership functions (Figure 7). Step-changes in the VMEC output indicate 
possible  boundaries of steady states (output values do not change for a certain period of time), 
attractor points (convergence of states) and periodic points (repeating states).  
Two step-changes about the 5.5 value on the y-axis (Figure 7, white line) indicate three possible 
VMEC steady state outcomes in the system. The VMEC outputs a value greater than 6 during the 
early stages of the simulation when all three sensors indicate high risk. This can be interpreted as the 
IAV taking over control being the virtuous outcome (class 2 ethical outcome). Where the VMEC 
returns values above 5 but below 6, there appear to be mitigating circumstances (e.g. low risk of 
collision, low risk of lane straying and/or low speed) that indicate a grey state (class 1 ethical 
outcome). For VMEC values below 5, the outcome is that there is no virtuous ethical reason for 
taking over control (class 0 ethical outcome). 
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Figure 7: Streamed output of virtual meta-ethics controller (VMEC, thick white line) for the three input sensors of speed 
(orange dotted line, one full cycle across 10 time units), lane adherence (blue, two cycles) and distance (yellow, four cycles), 
with the corresponding streamed output of the right/wrong reasoner in thick green and the good/bad reasoner in thick 
purple. The y axis represents both the range of input values and output fuzzy values, but note that the speed input values 
(varying between 0 and 100 mph) have been multiplied by 0.1 to fit them on the graph for the sake of legibility.  
Variable time-step sizing over 10 time steps, where the step size is reduced when the model changes 
rapidly and increased when the model is static, resulted in 227 of the 308 samples (73.7%) being in 
class 0 (VMEC output values below 5), 20 (6.5%) in class 1 (between 5 and 5.99) and 61 (19.8%) in 
class 2 (6 and above).  
Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) of the six continuous variables using squared Euclidean distance 
as the similarity measure and centroid clustering as the method for separating clusters showed that 
the output of the VMEC was closer to (more associated with) the right/wrong output (distance of 
104.47)  than the good/bad output (137.93). The average VMEC steady state class values were 4.69 
for class 0, 5.50 for class 1 and 6.48 for class 2. 
NNge (nearest neighbour with generalization) is a rule induction algorithm [28] that merges 
exemplars and forms hyperreactangles in feature space [29] to produce rules containing ranges of 
values for continuous variables. NNge is known for producing verbose and extensive rule sets for 
maximum knowledge extraction. NNge using the five continuous variables (three sensor and two 
ethical reasoner streamed data) correctly classified all 308 samples into the three discrete virtuous 
classes using the following learned virtuous moral rules (VMRs):  
VMR1: IF  (0.0 ≤ distance ≤ 6.0)  AND (0.0 ≤lane ≤ 8.25) AND (0.0 ≤ speed ≤ 79.9)  AND (4.75 ≤ 
goodbad_output ≤ 5.46)  AND (3.54 ≤ rightwrong_output ≤ 4.47) THEN virtuous ethical class 0. 
VMR2: IF  (0.48 ≤ distance ≤ 9.86) AND (goodbad_output = 5.5) AND (rightwrong_output = 5.5)  
THEN virtuous ethical class 1 (grey state). 
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VMR3: IF  (5.0 ≤ distance ≤ 10.0) AND (8.04 ≤ lane ≤ 10.0) AND (66.1 ≤ speed ≤ 85.4) AND (7.03 ≤ 
goodbad_output ≤ 7.73) AND (6.04 ≤ rightwrong_output ≤ 6.97) THEN virtuous ethical class 2. 
VMR3 provides the metric-based ethical rule that taking over control from the human is virtuous if 
the distance risk is between 5 and 10, the lane risk is between 8 and 10 and the speed is over 66 
mph. In this case, the good/bad dimension is over 7 and the right/wrong dimension over 6. The 
upper bounds can be ignored since they reflect the maximum values in the sampled data. VMR1 
states that there is no virtuous ethical reason to take over if the good/bad dimension is below 5.46 
and the right/wrong dimension is below 4.47. The lower bounds can be ignored since they reflect 
the minimum values in the sampled data. VMR2 is the default grey state between the two other 
states and is specified by the deontological and consequentialist outputs both being neither too high 
nor too low (= 5.5).  Ten-fold cross-validation holding back a random 10% of samples in each fold 
also produced 100% correct classification, indicating that the learned rules are effective and reliable 
under NNge.  
A perceptron with the five variables (three sensor, two ethical) as input, three hidden units and 
three output nodes (one for each class of VMEC outcomes), with learning rate 0.3, momentum 0.2 
and 500 training epochs, successfully learned all 227 class 0 cases and 61 class 2 cases but wrongly 
classified all class 1 samples as class 2. A series of ANN experiments using a perceptron (three 
sensors and two level 1 ethical reasoners as input, three VMEC classes as output) showed that the 
‘minimum’ architecture required for successful learning of all 308 instances required a learning rate 
of 0.1, a momentum of 0.2, 1000 training epochs and 4 hidden nodes. 10-fold cross-validation using 
these parameters resulted in an overall 95.13% accuracy, with all class 0 and class 2 samples 
correctly classified but only 5 of the class 1 samples correctly classified (6 classified as class 0 and 9 
as class 2). Increasing the training epochs to 10,000 resulted in further improvement to 98.43% 
accuracy (2 class 1 wrongly classified as class 2). Adding additional hidden units did not improve the 
performance. In other words, the ANN had difficulty in generalizing to the grey class, possibly due to 
the its relative under-occurrence in comparison to the other two classes.   
Linear regression with the continuous VMEC output values as the dependent variable and the five 
other variables (three sensor, two ethics) as independent variables resulted in an  R2 of 0.97 (i.e. 97% 
of variance in the dependent variable explained) and the following model: 
2.208 (constant) + 0.67 (goodbad) + 0.17 (lane) + 0.22 (rightwrong) + 0.059 (speed) −0.09 (distance) 
The highest coefficient (0.67) is for goodbad, indicating that, according to regression, this has the 
most influence.  
While VMR1-VMR3 focus on identifying circumstances under which it is ethical for an IAV to take 
over control, the rules can also be adapted to identify circumstances under which the IAV should, 
morally, hand control back to the human. Each of VMR1-VMR3 can be amended so that the 
conclusions are interpreted as staying in the same ethical state or moving to a new ethical state if in 
a different state. So VMR1, for instance, can be interpreted as being ethical to hand back control to 
the human if the immediately previous moral state was not class 0.  
5.2 Ethical dilemmas 
Many aspects of the architecture can be used for adapting the moral reasoner to deal with 
dilemmas. As noted earlier, moral dilemmas are characterized by morally right (deontological) action 
leading to morally bad (utilitarian or consequentialist) outcomes, and vice versa. With dilemmas, 
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rightness and wrongness must be balanced against goodness and badness to reach justified 
judgements.  
Consider the situation where an IAV is confronted by a child crossing the road in front of it and it is 
too late to brake without hitting the child. It must decide whether to brake and take avoidance 
action by swerving onto the pavement where almost certainly, according to its sensors, an adult will 
be killed, or whether to keep going straight. In this situation, there is no virtuous outcome where 
someone is not going to be badly injured or die. One moral decision is to justify swerving onto the 
pavement on the basis that the life of a child counts more than the life of an adult.  
To address this dilemma, the IAV needs two sensors to provide information concerning risk of death 
by driving straight ahead and risk of death by taking swerving action. These two sensors feed into 
the right/wrong reasoner that has two outputs for swerving being wrong and serving being right. A 
third sensor identifies the age of any pedestrian straight ahead. SI, Table 2 provides details of the 
membership functions and Figure 8 an overview of the ethical dilemma architecture. Figures 9, 10 
and 11 provide visualizations of all the variables used in the dilemma architecture.  
 
 
Figure 8: Moral dilemma architecture, with sensors for identifying what is straight ahead and what is on the pavement for 
the right/wrong reasoner, and a sensor for pedestrian age for the good/bad reasoner, with the dilemma controller 
providing various dilemma outputs for varying sensor values. 
The principles for each of the dilemma reasoners are uncontroversial. For the right/wrong reasoner, 
the two dilemma principles (RWDPs) are: 
RWDP1: If going straight ahead leads to high risk of death and swerving leads to low risk of death, 
then swerving is right. 
RWDP2: If going straight ahead leads to low risk of death and swerving leads to high risk of death, 
then swerving is wrong. 
For the good/bad dilemma reasoner, the principles (GBDPs) are: 
GBDP1: If pedestrian is young then taking avoiding action is good. 
GBDP2: If pedestrian is not young then not taking avoiding action is not bad. 
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Figure 9: The two input variables of the right/wrong dilemma reasoner, with straight ahead (top) and swerve (middle) each 
containing two MFs ‘lowriskdeath’ and highriskdeath’, and output variable (bottom) with two MFs ‘swervewrong’ and 
‘swerveright’. All MF parameters are specified in S1, Table 3. 
GPDP2 is not a licence to run over older pedestrians but is a principle to be interpreted in the 
context of no other action being possible when faced with pedestrians who will be injured no matter 
what course of action one takes.  
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Figure 9: The input and output variables of the good/bad dilemma reasoner, with ‘pedestrian’ (input, top) having two MFs 
(young, old) and ‘avoid’ (output, bottom) have two MFs (avoidgood, avoidbad). All MF parameters are specified in S1, Table 
2. 
The ethical dilemma controller (EDC) takes as inputs the two outputs from the right/wrong and 
good/bad reasoners and combines them into an output using the following two ethical dilemma 
principles (EDCPs): 
EDCP1: If deathrisk is high and pdestrianrisk avoid is good then brake but swerve. 
EDCP2: If deathrisk is low and pedestrianrisk avoid is bad then brake and continue straight ahead.  
For simulation purposes, the signal generators for straight, swerving and pedestrian age (multiplied 
by 0.1 to fit the values on the graph) vary from 1 to 10, and with one full cycle, two full cycles and 
four full cycles, respectively. The simulation is run this time with fixed steps in discrete time to 
ensure that the greatest variety of inputs to outputs (Figure 11).  
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Figure 10: The two input variables and one output variable of the dilemma controller, with deathrisk (input, top) having two 
MFs (riskdeathlow, riskdeathhigh), pedestrianrisk (input, middle) two MFs (avoidbad, avoidgood) and dilemmadecision 
(output, bottom) two MFs (donotswerve, donothitchildren). All MF parameters are specified in S1, Table 2. 
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Figure 11: Output of dilemma controller (thick white line) for the three input sensors of straight direction (yellow dotted 
line), swerve (blue dotted line) and pedestrian age (orange dotted line), with the corresponding outputs of the right/wrong 
reasoner in green and the good/bad reasoner in purple. The y axis represents both the range of input values and output 
fuzzy values, but note that the age input values (varying between 0 and 100) have been multiplied by 0.1 to fit them on the 
graph for the sake of legibility. 
26 samples were produced, with the dilemma output having a mean value of 5.52 and median of 
6.02. Using the median value as the cut point to distinguish class 1 (‘brake and go straight ahead’) 
and class 2 (‘brake and swerve’), NNge produced the following ethical rules (EDRs) for addressing the 
dilemma: 
EDR1: IF (30.1 ≤ pedestrian age) AND (3.23 ≤ swerve_rightwrong ≤ 7.77) AND (3.54 ≤ avoid goodbad 
≤ 3.94) THEN the appropriate moral outcome is brake and go straight ahead 
EDR2: IF (3.6 ≤ risk of death by going straight ahead) AND (0.2 ≤ pedestrian age ≤ 20) AND (7.71 ≤ 
swerve rightwrong) AND 6.96 ≤ avoid goodbad)  THEN the appropriate moral outcome is brake and 
swerve. 
ER3: IF (7.92 ≤ risk of death by swerving) AND (2.6 ≤ pedestrian age ≤ 24.9) AND (3.25 ≤ swerve 
rightwrong ≤ 5.5) AND (6.3 ≤ avoid goodbad) THEN the appropriate moral outcome is brake and go 
straight ahead.  
EDR1 states that if the pedestrian in front is over 30, if swerving has moderate to high risk of death 
(between 3.2 and 7.8) and there is not enough good reason to take avoiding action (between 3.5 and 
4), then the morally correct action is to go straight ahead in this dilemma.  
EDR2 states that the morally correct decision when confronted by a risk of death of greater than 3.6 
by going straight ahead and when the pedestrian in front is below 20 years of age is to swerve, given 
that swerving is good in this situation (i.e. above 6.3) even if it is not totally right to swerve (swerving 
is right value of between 3.5 to 5.5).  
However, EDR3 modifies EDR2 by adding that if the risk of death is very high for swerving and the 
pedestrian is between 2.6 and 25 years old, but swerving is right is not greater than 5.5 even if it is 
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good to swerve (above 6.3), then the morally correct action in this dilemma is to brake and go 
straight ahead.  
While some may argue that it may always be better to swerve to hit a child, an IAV that has the 
dilemma reasoner above encapsulates this moral dictum to some extent but not to every extent. 
6. Discussion 
The aim of the research was to identify whether a fuzzy ethical reasoner could generate its own data 
for learning ethical rules to help it determine when it was ethical to take over control or hand 
control back to humans. The results above indicate that it is possible to introduce minimal and non-
controversial moral principles in three different moral dimensions: the right/wrong dimension, the 
good/bad dimension, and the meta-ethics virtue dimension of combining the two previous moral 
dimensions. The system is ‘autometric’ because, through simulation using fuzzy logic, the ethical 
reasoner can generate its own data for learning moral rules and models without interference or bias 
from humans. Once an initial set of rules or models is derived, the ethical reasoner can use these as 
a benchmark for refining or experimenting with variations in the same or other risk membership 
functions to help it determine other possible circumstances under which it is ethical to take over 
control or hand it back. For instance, HCA showed that the VMEC output was closer to the 
deontological dimension (right/wrong) than the consequentialist (good/bad) dimension. While this 
may be appropriate for IAVs, IAMs in other situations (e.g. robots helping to nurse aged people) may 
have membership function shapes and values that lead to stressing the utilitarian aspects of 
respecting autonomy more than the deontological so that humans do not feel controlled.   
The architecture of Figure 6 can be totally separate from the actual control architecture of an IAM.  
The actual control architecture of an IAV, for instance, is likely to contain many more sensors and 
much faster sampling rates than those required by an ethics architecture. Three possibilities exist. 
The first is for the ethics architecture to be totally independent of the control architecture (zero 
ethics coupling). The architecture provides an ethical commentary to the sensor-based behaviour of 
the IAM but does not interfere in any way with the actual behaviour of the IAM. Such commentary 
could be used off-line to monitor and evaluate AIM actions in responses to sensor data. The second 
is for the ethics architecture to work in parallel with the control architecture of an IAM so that 
control architecture output and ethics architecture output are combined in some way (parallel ethics 
coupling) for ‘morally considered’ action. And the third possibility is for the output of the control 
architecture to be one of the inputs to the ethics architecture (serial ethics coupling) so that no 
action is possible without ‘ethical approval’. The choice of architectural involvement will depend on 
the context in which IAMs will be used. Perhaps sometime in the future there will be a requirement 
for all IAMs that have the potential to inflict harm on humans to have a compulsory ethics 
architecture so that control information and ethics outcomes can be used together in parallel or in 
serial mode.  
When dealing with ethical dilemmas that trade off aspects of deontology with consequentialism, the 
results again indicate that adopting a fuzzy logic approach can produce a spectrum of outputs that 
can be used to learn what to do when confronted by such dilemmas. Not everyone will agree with 
the decisions made by an IAV in these situations, but that is in the nature of dilemmas. The 
important point here is that the IAV can provide reasons for its decisions, which can in turn lead to 
refinement through improved membership functions and the introduction of more fuzzy variables if 
appropriate. Transparency of reasoning is critical in resolving moral dilemmas, even if the outcomes 
are not universally agreed.  
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We have also shown how the ethical reasoner, through a fuzzy logic approach, achieves interactivity, 
autonomy and adaptability. Interactivity is achieved through dynamic processing of sensor 
information to ensure that moral judgements are continuously made and monitored. Autonomy is 
achieved through the system internally processing data from sensors and simulations using 
principles but deriving rules from this internal processing without human intervention. Adaptability 
is achieved through simulations of dilemmas that allow the system to trade off aspects of 
right/wrong against good/bad.  
None of this is achievable without human designers providing the first set of principles and fuzzy 
variables using a variety of membership functions. But human designers do not have to specify every 
possible ethical situation using the approach described here and can leave the derivation of 
appropriate rules to the ethics architecture. As noted by several researchers, just because fuzzy logic 
deals with inexactness and approximation due its use of the real number interval between 0 and 1, 
that does not mean that fuzzy logic cannot be subject to formalization of its inferential processes 
[52] so that fuzzy reasoning is shown to be effective and computable [53]. By limiting the 
involvement of human designers to the input of uncontroversial principles and an initial choice (and 
shape) of membership functions to be used for representing those principles, the danger of 
introducing biases and prejudices is minimized. The only human input initially is in the first set of 
principles and risk membership functions to help the autometric ethical IAM establish a base from 
which to learn enhanced models of ethical reasoning. There is no reason why an IAM should not 
choose different membership functions and shapes to experiment with through evolutionary 
algorithms, for instance. 
Finally, research into how values can be embedded into autonomous intelligent systems through 
advances in data collection, sensor technology, pattern recognition and machine learning is now 
actively encouraged as a method of achieving a correct level of trust between humans and 
autonomous intelligent systems [54].  Ethical reasoning in philosophy and machine ethics has so far 
dealt almost exclusively with qualitative reasoning. The use of intervals and values in the range of 0 
and 1 in ethical output is not familiar to us humans and could lead to accusations of a metric-based 
ethics being ‘ethics by numbers’.  But we have shown that it is possible to assign categories to the 
output of autometric reasoning for class-based or categorical learning if required. But more 
importantly, if we want our IAMs to develop a sense of right and wrong so that they do not harm us, 
we may have to accept that non-qualitative, metric-based ethics is the best way to go.  
Model code and data availability 
The MATLAB code for all fuzzy logic reasoners and the Simulink simulation, as well as the data 
produced by the simulation for use in data mining and statistical analysis, will be made available by 
emailing the corresponding author from an academic email address. 
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Supplementary Information (SI) 
 
SI, Table 1: Fuzzy models, variables, membership functions and MATLAB parameters for an IAV to decide when to take over 
control from a human driver 
Fuzzy moral 
dimension 
(model) 
Variable Range Membership 
functions 
Shape Parameters 
Right_wrong 
(3 input, 1 
output), 
centroid 
Distance 
(input) 
1-10 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 5, 6]; 
[5, 6, 10, 10] 
 Lane: input 1-10 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 8, 9]; 
[7, 8, 10, 10] 
 Speed: input 1-100 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 40, 80]; 
[40, 80, 100, 
100] 
 Take control 
right or wrong 
(tcrightwrong): 
output 
1-10 2 (tcwrong; 
tcright) 
zmf; smf [7, 10]; [4, 7] 
Good_bad (3 
input, 1 
output), 
centroid 
Distance: input 1-10 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 5, 6];  
[5, 6, 10, 10] 
 Lane: input 1-10 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 8, 9]; 
[7, 8, 10, 10] 
 Speed: input 1-100 2 (low risk; 
high risk) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 40, 80]; 
[40, 80, 100, 10] 
 Take control 
good or bad 
(tcgoodbad): 
output 
1-10 2 (tcbad; 
tcgood) 
zmf; smf [4,8]; [2,6] 
Virtuous meta 
ethics 
controller (2 
input, one 
output, 
centroid 
Take control 
right or wrong 
(tcrw): input 
1-10 2 (rwdtc; 
rwtc) 
zmf; smf [1, 10]; [1,10] 
 Take control 
good or bad 
(tcgb) 
1-10 2 (gbdtc; 
gbtc) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 5, 6]; [5, 6, 
10, 10] 
 Control 1-10 2 zmf; smf [5.5, 10]; [1, 5.5] 
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SI, Table 2: Parameters for variables and membership functions of the moral dilemma reasoner in MATLAB (Figure 8). Note 
that ‘gbelmf’ stands for a bell-shaped membership function and ‘gaussmf’ for a Gaussian-shaped membership function. 
Fuzzy dilemma 
reasoner 
Variable Range Membership 
functions 
Shape Parameters 
Dilemma_right_wrong 
(2 input, 1 output), 
centroid 
Straight: input 1-10 2 (low risk of 
death; high risk of 
death) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 2,3]; 
[2,3,10,10] 
 Swerve: input 1-10 2 (low risk of 
death; high risk of 
death) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 2,3]; 
[2,3,10,10] 
 Rightwrong: 
output 
1-10 2 (swerve is 
wrong; swerve is 
right) 
zmf;smf [5,6]; [5,6] 
Dilemma_good_bad 
(1 input, 1 output), 
centroid 
Pedestrian: input 1-10 
(age 
*0.1) 
2 (young; 
notyoung) 
trapezoidal [0, 0, 2,3];  
[2,5,10,10] 
 Avoid: output 1-10 2 (avoid is bad; 
avoid is good) 
zmf;smf [4,8]; [2,6] 
Dilemma_controller (2 
input, one output, 
centroid) 
Deathrisk: input 1-10 2 (deathrisklow; 
deathriskhigh) 
gbelmf [4.5, 3, 1]; 
[4.5, 2.5, 
10] 
 Pedestrianrisk: 
input 
1-10 2 (avoidbad; 
avoidgood) 
gbelmf [5, 2.5, 0]; 
[5, 2.5, 10] 
 Dilemmadecision: 
output 
1-10 2 (straightahead; 
swerve)  
gaussmf [1,3]; [1,7] 
 
